For more than 30 years the U.S. and individual states have delayed major infrastructure investments. Bridges, sewer and water systems, railroads, and many other major parts of our physical systems throughout the country have been neglected. As they continue to deteriorate, the investment required for repairs goes up. Sometimes these costs escalate exponentially.
There are a couple of variables that might be used to track this problem. Total infrastructure expenditures for repairs versus new construction might be used. Also, using the civil engineering surveys and ratings that are done periodically might be used to track the number of required repairs.
This system has economic (hard) and political (soft) components. The political will required by the public to require government to address these problems requires sacrifice of other services. The repairs(hard) are controlled by industries that compete for tax dollars and political influence(soft). The economic factors include damage(hard) to personal and commercial vehicles, possible loss of life(soft) due to system failure, cost burdens(hard) on cities, utilities, and their customers. The time delay(hard) before these problems are addressed will magnify the problems by not only increasing the costs but by also affecting commerce because of closed bridges and roads, limits on growth due to sewer and water system constraints, new industry going elsewhere because lack of good internet, reliable power, or available tax incentives to build new plants.
The repairs will be made by the government. The public affects how important this is to the government. Repair companies have lobbyists. Delay makes the problem worse. The damage creates loss of tax revenue because these issues affect the economy overall now and more later if catastrophe strikes.
This problem Brooks is describing somewhat reminds me of the similar problem Du Pont was having in the case study in Chapter 2 (how neglect leads to costly, reactive maintenance). Perhaps more funding for preventive maintenance should be invested in our infrastructure as opposed to reactive maintenance or new construction. Although the preventive maintenance may be costly in the short-run it would likely prove worth while in the future. This too appears to be a systems problem seeing as there are tightly coupled variables, multiple interacting feedbacks, time delays, and hard and soft elements. I think the author has used an expanded model boundary and has included some of the most significant elements needing consideration. To add, one other method of tracking this problem of neglect/deterioration could be to compare an infrastructure that supports preventive maintenance to some of these neglected infrastructure problems. The results may be used to expand the mental models of the infrastructure policymakers and to combat the aspect of denial. The author's description of the underlying system overall makes sense. It outlines the significant elements in the system (both on the surface and below) and details their interaction with another (including the reinforcing and balancing feedbacks). It also recognizes that the decisions of policymakers have multiple effects (ripples perhaps) that may not be receiving consideration.
ReplyDeleteThanks for the input Martin. It would be interesting to see if any governments handle this problem better. I think China has a similar issue but it is hard to know if their infrastructure spending is hurting them economically in the long run. In other words, are they creating a situation similar to Japan in the 90's? Perhaps we could learn something from a smaller, well-kept country like Sweden or Denmark?
ReplyDeleteBrooks, I am in agreement with you that infrastructure maintenance spending has taken a back seat to infrastructure expansion in this country and Virginia is one of the worst offenders. You mention the influence of the industries that are competing for these tax dollars but one additional item that could considered are these industries direct actions against each other.
ReplyDeleteI was watching a program a few months back that highlighted America's love of the automobile and all of the advancements that had taken place over the last century. What I was surprised to hear was that car companies realized early on that competition with streetcar and light rail were not in their best interest and decided to undercut those industries directly. Car companies began to buy up manufacturers of street cars and trollies and through poor management and other "economic" difficulties lead the companies to ruin. This had the effect of tying future development in the Western states largely to the automobile as can be witnessed in California and ensuring that the automobile infrastructure got a larger share of the pie.
Very good discussion, folks. This is a very nice example. I like Brooks' choice of variables to help understand the problem.
ReplyDeleteThis is very similar to the DuPont problem (as Martin points out). It's also very similar to a problem with the water infrastructure in Wise County, VA, where a great deal of gov't money was used to expand the water infrastructure in order to provide more people with water thru larger reservoirs, etc. The counterintuitive result was that (after about 50 yrs of such policy), fewer people were getting water, and water supply costs were thru the roof. One of our MS students (Patsy Salyers) did a very nice thesis on this, including a well built system dynamics model. Her work helped influence future water management policies in Wise County.